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COLLOQUIUM
LAWYERING IN THE REGULATORY STATE
FOREWORD
Nancy J. Moore*
INTRODUCTION
In common parlance, the “regulatory state” refers to governance through
specialized administrative agencies, such as the federal agencies that arose
during the progressive era in the United States.1 Lawyering in the
regulatory state takes a number of different forms, including the private
representation of clients who are either litigating before agencies or facing
compliance issues, as well as the public employment of lawyers within the
agencies themselves. Both types of regulatory lawyering raise a wide range
of unique ethical issues for lawyers and are the subject of the articles in this
Fordham colloquium entitled Lawyering in the Regulatory State. These
issues arise in the context of federal administrative agencies that we have
heard much about, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO), lesser-known federal agencies, such as the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Consumer Products
Safety Commission (CPSC), the Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review (ODAR), and the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and a
host of state agencies that “affect[] everyday life in countless ways.”2 The
authors use a variety of methodologies, including traditional legal analysis,
as well as empirical3 and historical4 research. Finally, they focus on such
* Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School of Law. This
Foreword provides an overview of the colloquium entitled Lawyering in the Regulatory State
held at Fordham University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., J.E. ANDERSON, THE EMERGENCE OF THE REGULATORY STATE (1962); see
also George M. Cohen, The Laws of Agency Lawyering, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1963 (2016).
2. Elizabeth Chambliss & Dana Remus, Nothing Could Be Finer?: The Role of Agency
General Counsel in North and South Carolina, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2040 (2016).
3. See id. at 2141 (“[The] account draws on interviews with current and former agency
counsel, agency directors, and lawyers in the state Attorney General’s office, as well as
roundtable discussions among agency counsel on topics of common interest.” (footnotes
omitted)); David Hausman & Jayashri Srikantiah, Time, Due Process, and Representation:
An Empirical and Legal Analysis of Continuances in Immigration Court, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1823 (2016); Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Kath Hall, Lawyers in the Shadow of the
Regulatory State: Transnational Governance on Business and Human Rights, 84 FORDHAM
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diverse issues as the role of agencies in facilitating access to justice,5 the
lawyer’s role as gatekeeper in agency litigation6 and regulatory
compliance,7 and the unique role of the in-house lawyer, both private8 and
public.9 Taken together, they open a large window on the complex work of
many lawyers who are often overlooked in the legal profession’s literature.
I. PRIVATE REGULATORY LAWYERS:
ADVOCACY AND ADVISING
The ethical conduct of private lawyers is often discussed in the context of
the lawyer as an advocate in civil or criminal litigation10 or as an advisor to
clients whose conduct pushes the limits of the law generally, including,
without differentiation, common law, statutes, and administrative
regulations.11 What largely has been ignored, however, are the special
problems associated with litigating before administrative agencies, many of
which have unique procedures,12 as well as the differing abilities of the
various agencies to secure compliance with their particular regulatory
regimes. In this colloquium, two of the articles on private regulatory
lawyering address the lawyer as litigator, whereas the remaining five
articles focus on lawyers who advise clients on regulatory compliance
issues.

L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2016) (noting that the article “draw[s] on interviews with twenty-nine
lawyers involved in the business and human rights field” (footnote omitted)).
4. See David McGowan, Lawyering Within the Domain of Expertise, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1929, 1929 (2016) (“This Article uses the history of patent prosecution to assess the
relationship between the practice of law and the claim of an administrative agency to possess
and to employ expertise.”).
5. For example, Hausman and Srikantiah examine the relationship between the length
of court continuances and the ability of immigrants and their families to obtain a private
lawyer. See Hausman & Srikantiah, supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., infra notes 23–35 and accompanying text (discussing article by Milan
Markovic that examines the lawyer’s potential role as gatekeeper in litigating Social Security
Disability Insurance claims).
7. See, e.g., infra notes 39–45, 47–54 and accompanying text (discussing an article by
Sung Hui Kim that defends her proposed reforms to enhance in-house lawyers’ role as
gatekeepers to prevent harm to the securities markets); infra notes 46, 55–61 and
accompanying text (discussing an article by Bernard W. Bell that examines the in-house
lawyer’s potential role as gatekeeper in promoting compliance with product safety
regulations).
8. See Bernard W. Bell, Recalling the Lawyers: The NHTSA, GM, and the Chevrolet
Cobalt, 84 FORDHAM L. REV 1899 (2016) (focusing on criticism of company’s in-house
lawyers in recent corporate scandal); Sung Hui Kim, Inside Lawyers: Friends or
Gatekeepers?, 84 FORDHAM L. REV 1867 (2016).
9. See Chamblis & Remus, supra note 2.
10. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
ETHICS 325–422 (9th ed. 2012).
11. See, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 6.22 (4th
ed. 2016) (discussing the prohibition against lawyers counseling or assisting unlawful
conduct).
12. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1 (discussing different regulatory regimes of different
federal agencies).
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In their article entitled Time, Due Process, and Representation: An
Empirical and Legal Analysis of Continuances in Immigration Court,13
David Hausman and Jayashri Srikantiah examine the role of lawyers in
administrative proceedings before immigration courts, which are overseen
by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, an office within the U.S.
Department of Justice. The issue for them is not the ethical conduct of the
immigrant family’s lawyer, but rather the proper role of these particular
administrative courts in facilitating the ability of an immigrant family
facing deportation to access justice through legal representation.14 Because
the proceedings are civil rather than criminal, there is no currently
recognized right to a government-funded lawyer for those who cannot
afford one.15 According to the empirical research of Hausman and
Srikantiah, only 14 percent of the immigrant families studied began their
immigration proceedings with a lawyer; however, after the immigration
judge advised them that they had a right to a lawyer at their own expense
and offered them a continuance to find one, as many as 44 percent found a
lawyer by the time of their second hearing.16 Moreover, “The more time
they had between hearings, the more likely they were to find a lawyer.”17
This time was necessary for them to either accumulate the money to pay a
lawyer or locate a lawyer willing to represent them for free.18
There is a consensus that immigration court judges must grant a
continuance after the first hearing; however, current law does not specify
the length of that continuance, and the practices of individual judges differ
significantly.19 Hausman and Srikantiah demonstrate the problematic
nature of this variability by first calculating the effect of having a lawyer on
the likelihood of deportation. Their research reveals a distinct pattern
between the length of a continuance (between the first and second hearing)
and eventual deportation. This correlation peaks at approximately 100
days,20 which is also the number of days making the most significant
difference in the ability of immigrants to find representation.21 As a result
of their research, they advocate a presumptive right to a ninety-day
continuance after the first hearing.22

13. Hausman & Srikantiah, supra note 3.
14. Id. at 1835 (discussing “origins and contours of the right to a reasonable time [for
immigrants facing deportation] to seek counsel”).
15. See id. at 1825 (discussing position of federal government that such immigrants have
no right to a government-provided lawyer); id. at 1825 n.9 (providing funding for lawyers to
represent unaccompanied children but not for lawyers to represent families with children
facing deportation).
16. Id. at 1826.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1827.
19. Id. at 1828.
20. See id. at 1832 fig.3.
21. Id. at 1830 (discussing Figure 2: Continuance Length and Representation for
Priority Docket Cases).
22. Id. at 1842–43.
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In his article entitled Lawyers and the Secret Welfare State,23 Milan
Markovic addresses an ethical problem that confronts lawyers litigating
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) claims before the federal
federal Office of Disability Adjudication and Review24 (ODAR). The issue
is whether and when lawyers are required to disclose to ODAR judges the
existence of evidence known to them that is adverse in some respect to their
client’s claim of disability.25 As Markovic notes, SSDI processes are
nonadversarial,26 the government is not represented in the hearings,27 and
Model Rule 3.3(d) of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct requires lawyers in ex parte proceedings to “inform
the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the
tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are
adverse.”28 Although one state bar has opined that this rule applies to SSDI
proceedings,29 another state bar opinion concludes that SSDI proceedings
are not ex parte because ODAR judges have the ability to develop the
record.30 There have been efforts to amend the Social Security Act to
require expressly the production of unfavorable evidence, but these efforts
were defeated, largely as the result of efforts of the organized bar.31
Markovic decries these efforts, pointing to the contrary posture of the
organized tax bar, which “largely supported legislative and regulatory
efforts that formalized tax lawyers’ gatekeeping responsibilities” in the
context of tax shelters.32
After developing an argument that distributive justice requires that
lawyers seeking public benefits for their clients act as gatekeepers by
refusing to pursue illegitimate client interests,33 Markovic addresses the
question of how this result can be achieved, given the opposition of the
organized bar. He proposes that the Social Security Administration (SSA)
“require lawyers to certify that, based on their review of the relevant client
materials, there is a reasonable basis to believe that their clients qualify for
benefits.”34 Concerned, however, that the agency might not have the
statutory authority to regulate lawyers in this manner, Markovic also
proposes that the SSA provide for voluntary certification, which could
benefit clients through “expedited and less exacting review.”35
23. Milan Markovic, Lawyers and the Secret Welfare State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1845
(2016).
24. He also address Medicaid planning, id. at 1847, but the emphasis in the article is on
litigating SSDI claims.
25. Id. at 1848.
26. Id. at 1847.
27. Id. at 1850.
28. Id. (citing and quoting ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(d) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2013)).
29. Id. at 1850 & n.40 (citing Ala. Bar Ass’n Disciplinary Comm’n, Op. RO-93-06
(1993)).
30. Id. (citing N.C. State Bar, 98 Formal Ethics Op. 1 (1999)).
31. Id. 1851.
32. Id. at 1861 (footnote omitted).
33. Id. at 1859.
34. Id. at 1862.
35. Id. at 1863.
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The concept of the lawyer as “gatekeeper” is more commonly invoked in
discussions of the role of the private lawyer as advisor to clients in
situations where the lawyer knows or arguably should know that the client’s
conduct may be unlawful.36 In the wake of Enron and other corporate
scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), pursuant
to which the SEC adopted regulations requiring lawyers who “appear and
practice” before the SEC to report credible evidence of corporate violations
up the ladder, all the way to the board of directors.37 Two of the
contributors to this colloquium invoke a more recent scandal involving
General Motors Company (GM) to reassess federal agency regulation of
lawyers for companies like GM.38
In 2014, after many years of delay, GM finally recalled 2.6 million
vehicles with a defective ignition switch, which by June 2015 had caused
hundreds of deaths and many more serious injuries.39
A report
commissioned by GM’s board concluded that GM’s in-house lawyers
knew, as early as 2005, that GM’s Cobalt had a tendency to stall while in
motion and learned in 2007 that the defective switch had been linked to an
air bag failure.40 In 2010, the lawyers apparently understood that the
Cobalt had a history of airbag deployments and had been warned by GM’s
outside products liability lawyers that GM could be subjected to punitive
damages for its inaction.41 Nevertheless, these in-house lawyers failed to
inform GM’s general counsel of the potential need for a recall until
December 2013.42 In 2014, four of GM’s in-house lawyers were
terminated, and the General Counsel announced his resignation.43
Our two contributors confront the GM scandal from two different
regulatory perspectives. Sung Hui Kim reiterates her previous criticism of
the SEC regulations adopted pursuant to SOX44 as inadequate to address
harm to the securities markets as a result of “inside lawyer acquiescence in
corporate fraud.”45 Bernard Bell is less concerned with preventing harm to
corporate shareholders and investors than he is with the need to promote
compliance with product safety regulations designed to protect the public
from serious harm caused by defective products such as GM’s Cobalt.46
36. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 8, at 1869 (discussing a previous article in which Kim
defined a “gatekeeper” as a “private intermediar[y] who can prevent harm to the securities
markets by disrupting the misconduct of [his or her] client representatives” (quoting Sung
Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 413 (2008))).
37. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 727–28, 740 (2004).
38. See infra notes 39–61 and accompanying text.
39. See Kim, supra note 8, at 1867.
40. Id. at 1868.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1–.7 (2015).
45. See Kim, supra note 8, at 1869. Kim wrote a series of articles promoting the inhouse lawyer’s role as gatekeeper, beginning with a 2005 article. See Sung Hui Kim, The
Banality of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel As Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
983 (2005). For a discussion of Kim’s critique of the SOX regulations, see id. at 1034–52.
46. See Bell, supra note 8.
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In her article entitled Inside Lawyers: Friends or Gatekeepers?, Kim
responds to a critic of an earlier article where she analyzed the “ethical
ecology” of in-house counsel, in which multiple roles “unleash
psychological pressures that strongly affect the actions and choices of
inside lawyers,” leading them to “turn a blind eye to unethical corporate
behavior.”47 Kim believed that the SOX regulations were inadequate to
address this problem and thus proposed an alternative reform in which: (1)
a committee of independent board members would oversee the corporate
legal department; (2) inside counsel would be guaranteed whistleblower
protection for any claim alleging retaliation; and (3) public companies
would either limit the amount of equity investments an in-house lawyer
could accept as compensation or otherwise minimize the potential for
Lawrence
conflicts of interest arising from such compensation.48
Hamermesh criticized this proposal as “radical” and cautioned that direct
board oversight would cause general counsel to lose access to information
they would otherwise receive through informal communications with senior
managers.49 Hamermesh responded with his own less-radical proposals
designed to encourage general counsels’ independence without sacrificing
the trust of senior managers.50
In her current article, Kim defends her earlier proposals, arguing that
Hamermesh’s alternative reforms do nothing to address “the structural
forces likely to lead inside lawyers to succumb to psychological pressures
in their multiple roles.”51 Conceding that it is at least plausible that her
proposed reforms might reduce the level of informal communication
between general counsel and senior managers, Kim argues that there are
numerous other sources of information, and, in any event, the likely
benefits of her proposals outweigh the potential costs.52 She concludes by
contrasting her vision of “lawyer as gatekeeper” with Hamermesh’s vision
of “lawyer as friend,”53 an image that featured prominently in a
controversial article authored by Charles Fried that has been the subject of
much criticism.54
In his article entitled Recalling the Lawyers: The NHTSA, GM, and the
Chevrolet Cobalt, Bell observes that the lawyer’s role as gatekeeper in the
context of the SEC’s newly enacted SOX regulations is not necessarily
inconsistent with the lawyer’s loyalty to clients because the goal of these
regulations is to counteract the corporate lawyer’s natural inclination “to
pursue management’s interests at other constituencies’ expense.”55 With
47. Kim supra note 8, at 1871.
48. Id. at 1871–72.
49. Id. at 1869–70 (discussing Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Who Let You Into the House?,
2012 WIS. L. REV. 359).
50. Id. at 1888.
51. Id. at 1875 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 1883.
53. Id. at 1887–95.
54. Id. at 1888–89 (discussing Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976)).
55. Bell, supra note 8, at 1900 (footnote omitted).
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respect to nonsecurities lawyers, however, there is less of an identity
between the lawyer’s client and regulatory beneficiaries, and yet “the
physical harms that may befall consumers [of defective products] are far
more serious than the financial losses shareholders typically suffer.”56 Bell
then uses GM’s response to the Cobalt ignition switch defect as a case study
to examine the question of whether it is legal and prudent for a regulatory
agency to impose gatekeeping responsibilities on such counsel.57
In recounting the actions of GM’s in-house and outside counsel, Bell
notes that, in contrast to the role of lawyers in SEC filings, neither set of
GM lawyers played a significant role in disclosures GM made to NHTSA.58
In-house lawyers were informed by outside products liability litigators of
the extent of the defect problem, and these in-house lawyers clearly took far
too long in responding to these concerns.59 However, Bell is not convinced
that the appropriate regulatory response is for product safety agencies to
regulate the conduct of lawyers. He questions the authority of these
agencies to enact such regulations, distinguishing them from the SEC,
which acted pursuant to authorization in the text of SOX, and further noting
that the GM lawyers did not “practice” before NHTSA, nor were they
involved in any “agency proceedings.”60 More importantly, he questions
whether it would be prudent for such agencies to attempt to make lawyers
serve as gatekeepers in the product safety context, arguing that they lack the
expertise to resolve controversial ethics issues and that there are alternative
ways of increasing company compliance; for example, by enacting
whistleblower bounties or by requiring the companies to obtain a lawyer’s
certification before taking certain actions.61
David McGowan is also concerned with the differing types of
relationships between lawyers and particular administrative agencies. In his
article entitled Lawyering Within the Domain of Expertise, McGowan
focuses on the PTO and then “uses the history of patent prosecution to
assess the relationship between the practice of law and the claim of an
administrative agency to possess and to employ expertise.”62 His thesis is
that “where an agency claims expertise, that claim will lead it to give
lawyers appearing before it less leeway than lawyers generally have.”63
McGowan’s historical review of patent prosecutions portrays the PTO as
swinging back and forth between claims of agency expertise, under which
the PTO would engage in a rigorous examination of a patent claim,64 and a
preference of “legal over technical expertise,”65 in which the PTO would
grant patent requests liberally and defer to courts the adjudication of
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1901.
Id.
Id. at 1903.
Id. at 1904–11.
Id. at 1914.
Id. at 1918–27.
McGowan, supra note 4, at 1929.
Id. at 1929–30.
See id. at 1931–33.
Id. at 1943.
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disputes between patent holders and their challengers.66 He demonstrates
how lawyers were ambivalent but generally sided with the liberal grant of
patents, not only because their inventor-clients preferred that regime, but
also because it permitted the lawyers to earn large contingent fees in patent
litigation and to exercise their “tradecraft.”67 In response to numerous
abuses of the liberal regime, in which lawyers played a significant role, the
PTO reasserted its own expertise, culminating in the adoption of agency
rules designed to prohibit “fraud and inequitable conduct” by applicants and
their agents, including lawyers.68 He concludes that “[t]hough there are
many justifications for regulation [of lawyers], an agency’s claim of
disinterested expertise will tend to produce stricter rules on lawyers’
behavior than would be found absent that claim.”69
Unlike the previous authors, George M. Cohen takes a comprehensive
approach to the “teeming variety of agency rules governing lawyers.”70 In
his article entitled The Laws of Agency Lawyering, Cohen takes a close look
at forty-six federal agencies with rules governing practice before these
agencies.71 He catalogues the different approaches they take and then seeks
to determine if there is a rational basis for these differences.
Cohen begins by examining the rather cursory treatment of private
agency lawyering under the ABA Model Rules, concluding that these rules
leave a number of unresolved questions, including the extent to which
violating an agency rule subjects a lawyer to discipline under state ethics
standards.72 He then turns to potential explanations and justifications for
federal agency rules regulating the conduct of lawyers, including the
following candidates: (1) specialized rules tailored to specific agency
practices; (2) rules that unify practice before agencies generally; (3)
uniform rules for lawyers and nonlawyers practicing before an agency; (4)
inadequate enforcement of state ethics rules; (5) multijurisdictional practice
issues; (6) private lawyer interests; (7) experimentation in lawyer
regulation; and (8) agency history and experience.73
In the remainder of the article, Cohen demonstrates detailed differences
among the lawyer conduct rules of the forty-six federal agencies he
examined, exploring variations with respect to the identification, format and
scope of such rules, as well variations in their content.74 He then analyzes
the extent to which these rules reflect the various justifications for agency
regulation. Noting that no “one explanation predominate[s]” over the
others,75 he provides examples of agency regulations reflecting each
proposed justification, concluding that “[d]ifferent theories better explain
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. at 1938–48.
Id. at 1955.
Id. at 1953.
Id. at 1955.
Cohen, supra note 1, at 1964.
Id. app. A.
Id. at 1965–72.
Id. at 1972–78.
Id. at 1978–89.
Id. at 1981.

2016] FOREWORD: LAWYERING IN THE REGULATORY STATE

1819

rules in different agencies, though the reason for the differences between
agencies is not always apparent.”76
Thus far, our colloquium contributors addressed private regulatory
lawyering in the context of administrative agencies within the federal
government of the United States. Milton C. Regan, Jr. and Kath Hall
expand the concept of private regulatory lawyering to consider the role of
lawyers for multinational companies in respecting human rights. In their
article entitled Lawyers in the Shadow of the Regulatory State:
Transnational Governance on Business and Human Rights, they describe
the challenges posed by the rise of what they call “a system of transnational
‘governance.’”77 Obviously, there is no international or transnational
“state” that is the equivalent of the nation state; therefore, by “governance”
they mean to “incorporate[] the network of actors, instruments, and
mechanisms that to varying degrees regulate transnational corporations
apart from formally authoritative state laws.”78 Looking to actors such as
“international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
industry and professional organizations and private sector providers,” the
authors examine “regulatory instruments” that include both legally binding
“hard law” and informal “soft law,” which is meant to influence conduct in
a more informal manner such as through financial or reputational
sanctions.79
After describing in some detail the protection afforded human rights
under this system of “transnational ‘governance,’”80 Regan and Hall begin
to examine the role of lawyers within this system.81 They do so through
interviews with twenty-nine lawyers who are involved in advising
businesses on human rights either as inside or outside counsel or are
employed in organizations that play a role in this field.82 The authors
identify various factors found to influence these lawyers’ provision of
human rights advice, including the binding or nonbinding nature of the
relevant human rights obligations, the ability to frame human rights issues
to appeal to client interests, and the relationship between outside and inside
counsel.83 They conclude that the most effective means of communicating
with clients consists of what they call “the risk management lexicon,”
including the risk of legal liability, the legal risks of nonbinding standards
that are likely to become “hard law,” and business risk, including harm to
the company’s reputation.84 Regan and Hall conclude by observing that
there is clearly a significant role for lawyers to play in this emerging system
76. Id.
77. Regan & Hall, supra note 3, at 2001.
78. Id. at 2001–02 (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 2002.
80. Id. at 2003–20.
81. Id. at 2020–30.
82. Of the twenty-nine persons interviewed, two were senior lawyers in corporate legal
departments, thirteen practiced at law firms, and fourteen worked for organizations that
focus on business and human rights. Id. at 2020.
83. Id. at 2020–21.
84. Id. at 2024–30.
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of transnational governance, but that it remains to be seen whether and how
various lawyers will be willing to confront a system that “challenge[s]
conventional understandings of what constitutes law and regulation.”85
II. PUBLIC REGULATORY LAWYERS
Our three contributions on public regulatory lawyering examine
strikingly different aspects of the professional lives of these lawyers. The
first set of authors, Elizabeth Chambliss and Dana Remus, use empirical
research to explore the counseling function of state agency lawyers,
including the extent to which they actually shape agency policy and
practice.86 Daniel J. Bussel focuses on the government lawyer’s role as a
third-party neutral when serving as an inquisitorial bankruptcy examiner
under the supervision of federal bankruptcy judges.87 Finally, Renee
Newman Knake explores the First Amendment rights of agency lawyers
when they are engaged in a unique type of activity she describes as
“assessment of the workplace.”88
In their article entitled Nothing Could Be Finer?: The Role of Agency
General Counsel in North and South Carolina, Chambliss and Remus note
that there has been considerable scholarship on the litigation role of state
attorneys general, but very little on the role of state attorneys in counseling
the agencies they work for.89 The counseling function is important because
these agency lawyers “provide day-to-day, front-end advice about a wide
range of issues,” including the “interpretation of statutes and regulations
[that] may significantly shape formal law,” much of which is never
reviewed.90
Drawing on interviews and roundtable discussions with lawyers who
have served in North or South Carolina as either current or former agency
counsel, agency directors, or employees with the state attorney general,
Chambliss and Remus examine “the structural evolution of the agency
general counsel position and the functional division between in-house
agency counsel and the Attorney General’s office,” as well as “the
characteristics and career paths of lawyers who serve as agency general
counsel” and the various “sources of authority in their roles.”91 They
discovered that agency general counsel are generalists, not specialists,92 and
that they are “relatively insulated from both hierarchical and political
pressure.”93 The coauthors conclude with observations on the limits of
their sample and identification of a future research agenda, including
expanding the sample to include former agency counsel and lawyers below
85. Id. at 2037.
86. Chambliss & Remus, supra note 2.
87. Daniel J. Bussel, Ethics for Examiners, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2073 (2016).
88. Renee Newman Knake, Lawyer Speech in the Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2099, 2101 (2016).
89. Chambliss & Remus, supra note 2, at 2039–40.
90. Id. at 2040.
91. Id. at 2041.
92. Id. at 2056–57.
93. Id. at 2058.
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the rank of agency counsel and examining the likelihood that further
developing organized networks will “promote the development of shared
professional norms and enhance agency counsels’ authority.”94
Bussel’s contribution, an article entitled Ethics for Examiners, builds on
his prior scholarship95 on bankruptcy examiners who have recently begun
to employ “inquisitorial”—that is, nonadversarial—methods of
investigation in large Chapter 11 reorganizations.96 These methods differ
from those employed by trustees or creditors’ committees, who, unlike
examiners, are not neutrals.97 Avoiding adversarial investigation and
litigation has many advantages, including efficiency and more accurate factfinding, but there are also costs, primarily the potential abuse of power by
the examiners themselves.98 To the extent they are regulated at all,
inquisitorial examiners are supervised by the appointing bankruptcy court
on an ad hoc basis.99 Bussel’s article explores the possibility of regulating
these examiners through binding codes of ethical conduct.100
Bussel begins by noting significant differences between the role of an
inquisitorial examiner and possible analogous positions, such as prosecutor,
judge, or mediator, concluding that these examiners are “sui generis” and
face “unique ethical quandaries and considerations.”101 He then describes
in some detail the work of an inquisitorial examiner, using three recent
cases he has discussed in his prior work.102 After identifying the ethical
framework in which such examiners work, including the important ways in
which their role differs from other lawyers and judges,103 Bussel addresses
specific ethical issues: due process values; deposing witnesses and ex parte
contacts; privileges; duties to the process and the public (including
independent judgment, transparency, efficiency, minimizing threats to
reorganization, overzealousness); and maintaining impartiality (for
example, by avoiding conflicts of interest and declining to combine
investigation with mediation).104 His tentative suggestions with respect to
each issue reflect his overall assessment of the particular nature of the
inquisitorial examiner’s role, which is often akin to the judicial role but
with some important exceptions, such as the need for access to privileged
material of the debtor.105
94. Id. at 2064.
95. See Daniel J. Bussel, A Third Way: Examiners As Inquisitors, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J.
(forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2587273 [https://
perma.cc/E2DH-MS67].
96. Bussel, supra note 87.
97. Id. at 2074.
98. Id. at 2075.
99. Id. at 2076.
100. See id. at 2073–79.
101. Id. at 2078–79.
102. Id. at 2079–82.
103. Id. at 2082–84.
104. Id. at 2084–96.
105. Compare, e.g., id. at 2083–84 (duties to the process and the public much like duties
of judges), with id. at 2086–88 (unlike a judge, an examiner has a need of access for a
debtor’s privileged material).
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Knake, who has previously argued in favor of strong First Amendment
protection for attorney advice and advocacy,106 builds on that prior work in
her article entitled Lawyer Speech in the Regulatory State.107 In this article,
she joins other scholars who have criticized “two highly controversial split
decisions from the Supreme Court ascribing minimal First Amendment
protection to government lawyer speech—Connick v. Meyers and Garcetti
v. Ceballos.”108 Her criticism is unique, however, in her focus on “the
significance of workplace assessment speech by lawyers in the context of
the regulatory state [which] has escaped the attention of commentators and
courts.”109
She begins by situating the two most recent Supreme Court cases within
a prior history of cases addressing the ability of government employers to
regulate the speech of their employees. Prior to Connick and Garcetti, the
Court was protective of the government’s role as employer, but carved out
an exception for employee speech relating to matters of public concern that
did not interfere with the efficient operation of the public employer.110 In
these two recent cases, however, Knake argues that the Court’s majority set
an unduly high bar for what constitutes matters of “public concern”111 and
further required that the employee speak as a private individual in order to
receive First Amendment protection.112 Both cases involved agency
lawyers, and as Knake observes, whistleblowing is arguably “a fundamental
aspect of the role of a lawyer, where professional obligations require a
fidelity to the democratic process and rule of law.”113 She concludes by
arguing that government lawyers, who are in a unique position to check
agency misconduct, deserve heightened protection when they exercise
“their professional judgment in deciding whether to engage in information
providing, watchdogging, or whistleblowing functions.”114
CONCLUSION
Taken together, these colloquium articles confront issues of great interest
to the legal profession. Whether they are addressing the ethical issues
facing private regulatory lawyers or the special concerns of public
regulatory lawyers, they identify questions that are relevant to the work of
an increasing number of lawyers. These lawyers, who have been largely
overlooked by the more traditional professional responsibility literature,
will find much to learn in the pages of this highly informative and thoughtprovoking colloquium.

106. See Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 639 (2011).
107. See Knake, supra note 88.
108. Id. at 2104 (footnotes omitted).
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110. Id. at 2106 (citing and discussing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
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112. Id. at 2109–11 (citing and discussing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)).
113. Id. at 2110.
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